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VOICE IDENTIFICATION BASED ON SPECTROGRAPHIC
ANALYSIS
This comment deals with spectrographic analysis and the
conflict between courts' criteria for admissibility, using either
the general-acceptance-of-the-scientific-community test or the
accuracy-and-reliability test. The conclusion drawn is that the
general-acceptance test should be coupled with judicial notice
to avert the undesirable situation of having a lay jury making
technical scientificjudgments.
Spectrographic analysis' is the process of making a visual representation of sound. A 1972 study2 of this process has suggested that a
trained examiner could achieve a high degree of accuracy in identifying
an unknown voice from among a number of known voices by visual
inspection of the two-dimensional representation of speech samples.3
1. State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 326, 239 A.2d 680, 683 (1968):
There are two basic types of voiceprints: (a) "bar" and (b) "contour". Both
types may be the result of a person uttering a cue word or other words as taped.
The "bar" voiceprint shows the resonance bars of the person's voice. The pattern of the bars determines what word is being said. In addition thereto, the voiceprint has dimensions of time (plotted from left to right, i.e., the beginning of the
word is at the left and the end is at the right); the frequency is plotted along the
vertical axis (the lower pitch of sound appears at the bottom and higher pitch
toward the top); and the loudness is ascertained by examining the blackness of
the printing (the darker lines of the bar represent greater intensity of sound at
each frequency for a particular time).
Kersta, Voiceprint Identification, 196 NATURE 1253, 1254 (1962), [hereinafter cited
as Kersta I:
The contour spectrogram (voiceprint)... has the same time and frequency
dimensions as the bar spectrogram. The amplitude, however, is shown by seven
quantized or contour steps. The term "contour" seemed applicable because the
amplitude contours on this type voiceprint are like contour portrayals, amplitude doubles with each inward progression from one contour to the next, and we
arrive at amplitude peaks as one arrives at altitude peaks on a topographical
map.
2. Tosi, Oyer, Lashbrook, Pedrey, Nichol, & Nash, Experiment on Voice Identification,
51 J. ACOUST. Soc. AMER. 2030 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Tosi]; Voice Identification
Research, A Report to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, United States
Department of Justice, Department of Michigan State Police, East Lansing, Michigan,
Grant No. N I 70-004, February 1971, p. 2 .
3. Tosi at 2041:
These findings suggest that if a trained nonprofessional examiner, using only
visual inspection of spectograms for purposes of identification and excluding any
kind of listening, is forced to reach a positive decision in each case (devoting approximately 15 minutes to complete the task), his (her) expected errors of false
elimination would be approximately 13%.
Further, considering the ratings of the scale of self-confidence used in this
project, it could be concluded that if the experimental examiners had not been
forced to produce a positive decision when uncertain, they would have reached a
positive conclusion on only 74% of the total number of experimental trials in-
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In the few cases which have thus far passed on the admissibility in
evidence of voice identifications based on the principle of spectrographic analysis, the courts have reached their decisions through an
application of either of the two tests: (1) whether the principle has
gained the acceptance of the general scientific community, (2) whether
the court has found that the process has sufficient accuracy and
reliability. Acceptance of voice identifications based on spectrographic
analysis in United States v. Wright 4 in 1967 was predicated upon the
"accuracy and reliability" test, while People v. King5 and State v.
Cary,6 which followed Wright in close succession in 1968 but denied
admissibility, were based on the "general scientific acceptance" test.
The most recent cases, State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman7 (1971) and
United States v. Raymond' (1972), have followed Wright in employing
the "accuracy and reliability" test. The purpose of this comment is to
delineate the courts' use of these tests and to substantiate the
conclusion that use of the "general scientific acceptance" test can
eliminate the necessity of having courts and juries make scientific
judgments-a problem which exists when the "accuracy and reliability"
test is employed.

THE ORIGIN AND THEORY OF SPECTROGRAPHIC
ANALYSIS
Speech spectrography was first developed at Bell Telephone
Laboratories in 1941' and was used for military purposes during World
War II." 0 It was not developed further until 1962 when L. G. Kersta' I
conducted a study,'2 the results of which indicated an approximate
error rate of one percent in voice identification based on spectrogram
examinations.' '

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

cluded in the forensic models, with approximately a 2% error of false identifications and approximately a 5% error of false eliminations.
It could be hypothesized that, if, in addition to visual comparisons of spectrograms, the examiners had been allowed to listen to the unknown and known
voices, these errors might have been further reduced. (emphasis added)
17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967).
266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968).
99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (1968), affd. 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970).
291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972).
Koenig, Dunn, & Lacy, The Sound Spectrograph, 18 J. AcousT. Soc. AMER. 19 (1946).
See also R. POTTER, G. Kopp & H. GREEN, VISIBLE SPEECH (1966).

10. Tosi, supra note 2. See also C. GRAY & G. Kopp, VOICEPRINT IDENTIFICATION, report presented to the Bell Telephone Lab., Inc. (1944).
11. L. G. Kersta is the founder and President of Voiceprint Laboratories, Inc., Somerville,
New Jersey.
12. See Kersta, supra note 1.
13. Tosi, supra note 2; Kersta, supra note 1.
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The validity of spectrographic analysis of the human voice is based
on the theory that each person's manner of speaking is unique because
of variations in (1) the size of and the manner in which the throat,
nasal, and oral cavities are coupled and (2) the manner in which the
lips, tongue, and other articulators are manipulated.1 "
The process of converting speech to its visual representation is
accomplished by a spectrograph. The recording of an unknown voice is
analyzed by an electronic filter and graphed on paper by an electronic
stylus which is activated by the energy produced by the voice. The
result is a spectrogram'
showing the relation of the voice's amplitude,
frequency, and time. An examiner visually compares this to other
spectrograms of known voices in an attempt to identify the unknown
voice.' 6

COURT DECISIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY
A. EARLY CASES
The first appellate decision in this area was State v. Cary'" which
remanded the case to determine whether the technique was accurate. A
few months later, the court in United States v. Wright' 8 affirmed the
trial court's admission of L. G. Kersta's' 9 testimony that he found
twenty-three points of identity between the spectrograms of the
defendant and an unknown person whose telephone call had been
recorded. 2 ' Although noting that there had been evidence of
disagreement in the scientific community as to the validity of this
process, the court felt that Kersta's testimony 2 ' established that the
14. Bolt, Cooper, David, Denes, Pickett, & Stevens, Speaker Identification by Speech
Spectrograms: A Scientists' View of its Reliability for Legal Purposes, 47 J. ACOUST.
Soc. AMER. 597 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bolt]. See also note 1 supra.
15. "Voiceprint" is the popular term for "spectrogram". It was first used in 1944 by Gray
and Kopp, supra note 10, and was copyrighted by Voiceprint Laboratories, Inc., supra
note 11.
16. Presti, High-Speed Sound Spectrograph, 40 J. AcOUST. Soc. AMER. 628 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Presti]; Bolt, supra note 14; Kersta, supra note 1.
17. 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967); the first lower court decision in which the principle
was accepted was apparently People v. Straehle (Westchester County, N.Y.) in N.Y.
Times, Apr. 12, 1966, at 1, col. 2. The indictment was dismissed when the jury failed
to reach a verdict.
18. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967).
19. See note 11 supra.
20. Kersta required a minimum of 16 points of identity as a basis for voice identification.
See United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967).
21. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 188-89, 37 C.M.R. at 451-52:
Starting in 1961, Kersta began to use the spectrograph to experiment with
voice identification of humans. In a two-year experiment, one hundred and
twenty-three persons were selected from the same "dialectical area" to eliminate
obvious voice identification factors. With a group of twelve high school students
trained by Mr. Kersta acting as voiceprint interpreters, a single word from voice
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process demonstrated a "high degree of accuracy"" 2 and that the jury,
having heard both recordings, could determine the margin of error in
Kersta's testimony which the court analogized to that of a psychiatrist
or handwriting analyst. The court said:
Courts have consistently recognized the admissibility of the
testimony of experts in areas where there is neither infallibility
of result nor unanimity of opinion as to the existence vel non of
a particular condition or fact. For example, the difference of
opinion among psychiatrists as to the mental condition of a
particular person is very well known. See United States v.
Henderson, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 556, 29 C.M.R. 372; United States v.
Carey, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 443, 449, 29 C.M.R. 259. Identifying the
author of a questioned document by comparison of the
handwriting of the document with other handwritings made by
known persons is commonplace in the courts, but it certainly
cannot be said that all experts in the field and all techniques of
identification are infallible. United States v. DeLeo, 5
U.S.C.M.A. 148, 153, 17 C.M.R. 148.2 3
The dissenting judge argued that the court's decision should be based
on how the process has been accepted by the scientific community:
Under the theme of the principal opinion, the results of a lie
detector test would appear to be clearly admissable. A trained
polygraph operator can undoubtedly qualify as an expert in his
field. The polygraph machine itself has also "experimentally
and in practical application, demonstrated a high degree of
accuracy." See Inbau and Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal
Interrogation, 3d ed. Nevertheless, it has been unanimously
rejected by the courts as evidence, on the basis that it has not
been shown to be generally accepted as reliable in the scientific
community. It is by that standard that the product of such
devices as the voiceprint machine is to be measured in
considering its admissibility and not by the self-evident fact that
samples of the one hundred and twenty-three subjects was compared to voiceprints in a file of 14,000 prints obtained from the voices of employees at the Laboratory. The students achieved 96.5 percent success in identifying the speaker.
Using a five-word sample, the students achieved 99.95 percent success. The results of this experiment were presented to the Acoustical Society of America and
were published in a respected British scientific journal.
In March 1966, Mr. Kersta retired from Bell Laboratories and established his
own firm to continue his work on voice identification and other sounds. Before
this case, he had prepared between four hundred and five hundred voiceprints
for use in "40 different cases" of law enforcement, and in various medical and
psychiatric applications, ranging from voice analysis to determine disease in the
vocal tract to the study of speech sounds as reflective of emotional stress. In the
specific area of voice identification, he had obtained verification in "practically
all of the cases" and, to his knowledge, had "made no mistakes".
Kersta's company later admitted to one mistaken identification. See note 42, infra.
22. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 189, 37 C.M.R. at 452.
23. Id.
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one of its inventors is an expert in its use and the interpretation
of the results. This is the standard which the principal opinion
ignores,
but which is the necessary predicate for decision in this
2

case.

4

He later quoted from Frye v. United States,2" a case which had
denied admissibility to the results of a systolic blood pressure deception
test:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult
to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force
of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs. 2 6
He also noted that in State v. Cary,2 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court,
in remanding the case for further inquiry into the reliability of
spectrographic analysis felt:
[T] hat something more than the bare opinion of one man,
however qualified, is required. Certainly the prosecutor must
satisfy the trial judge that identification by voiceprint technique
and equipment has a sufficient scientific basis to produce
uniform and reasonably reliable results. .. 8
The dissenting judge also felt that one aspect of the majority's
holding had precluded effective impeachment of Kersta's testimony.2 9
24. United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 190, 37 C.M.R. 447, 453 (1967)
(dissenting opinion).
25. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
26. United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 193, 37 C.M.R. 447, 455 (1967) (dissenting
opinion) quoting United States v. Frye, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
27. State v. Cary was an appeal from a pre-trial order compelling the defendant to submit
to a voice recording. The New Jersey Supreme Court in 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384
(1967), remanded the case for a determination of whether the technique was sufficiently accurate, noting that more than the opinion of one man would be required. On
remand, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (1968), the court decided against admissibility. In 53 N.J. 256, 250 A.2d 15 (1969), the case again was remanded at the state's
request to take further expert testimony. When the state failed to take additional
testimony within the prescribed time, the New Jersey Supreme Court in 56 N.J. 16,
264 A.2d 209 (1970), affirmed the decision in 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (1968),
for the reasons stated in that opinion.
28. United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 193-94, 37 C.M.R. 447, 455 (1967)
(dissenting opinion), quoting State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967).
29. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 195, 37 C.M.R. at 456. The majority decided that the trial court's
refusal to allow one of the two defense witnesses to testify regarding the published
results of a study to show that it was part of the basis for his opinion was not prejudicial
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In People v. King,3 0 which reversed a decision which allowed
identification based on spectrogram examination, the court recalled
past judicial error in the acceptance of identification methods." Kersta
testified that his method had the same accuracy as fingerprint
identification but agreed with the seven defense witnesses that it had
not achieved general scientific acceptance. Other defense witness
his technique3 2 and
criticisms included Kersta's failure to reveal 3fully
3
its inferiority to aural identification of voices.
The court's decision, like the dissent in Wright, was based on its
finding that there had not been general acceptance of the process in the
scientific community, 3 4 citing Frye as authority for this requirement.
The court dealt extensively with the issue of whether or not Kersta was
a qualified expert3" and concluded that it "must not be overwhelmed
by self-proclaimed experts" 3 6 nor should it receive "self-serving
opinions" 3 ' before a process has received general scientific acceptance.
State v. Cary3 8 overturned a pre-trial order compelling the defendant
error. The dissent argued that the jury was "allowed to know nothing of the extensive
research and published studies which underpinned Clark's opinion.... Yet, Kersta
was permitted to testify at will concerning the accuracy of his method, the scientific
praise it had received, and the fact that he had heard no criticism....
30. 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968).
31. Id. at 445-46, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 483-84:
A Classic case of the erroneous acceptance of identification methods was the
so-called Bertillon (French) system of identification which was used extensively
in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Originally devised by Leonardo daVinci, the so-called Bertillon, or anthropometric method, is no longer used by the courts
because of large margins of error which resulted in many errors of identification.
We must be careful that the use of "voice-prints" does not repeat the tragic lessons of the Bertillon system.
See A. BERTILLON, METHOD FOR IDENTIFICATION OF CRIMINALS, INSTRUCTIONS FOR
TAKING MEASUREMENTS AND DESCRPTIONS (G. Muller transl. 1887).
32. See also Stevens, Williams, Carbonell, & Woods, Speaker Authentication and Identification: A Comparison of Spectrographic and Auditory Presentations of Speech Material, 44 J. AcousT. Soc. AMER. 1596 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Stevens); P.
LADEFOGED & R. VANDERSLICE, THE VOICEPRINT MYSTIQUE, WORKING PAPERS IN PHONETICS

7 (1967) [hereinafter cited as LADEFOGED].
33. See also Stevens, supra note 32.
34. People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 458, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 491 (1968):
The present lack of reliability of the "voiceprint" process was best stated by the
Speech Communications Committee of the Acoustical Society of America. The
Committee unanimously passed a resolution rejecting Kersta's claim of reliability for his "voiceprint" process; the resolution stated that the sound spectrogram
does not contain sufficient information to identify individual speakers.
35. Id. at 456, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 490:
A person may be an expert in a field or scientific discipline but not concerned with
certain problems or familiar with certain areas within the field. Communication
by speech does not fall within any one established category of science. Its understanding requires a knowledge of anatomy, physiology, physics, psychology and
linguistics. It requires a knowledge of points of view and methods of investigation
of several disciplines. Absent other methods of verification, or general acceptance
by the scientific community or independent experts, a court could only receive
Kersta's opinion on faith.
36. Id. at 457, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
37. Id. at 458, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
38. 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (1968).
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to submit to a voice recording in order that a spectrogram could be
made from it and compared with one of an unknown caller. Kersta
again testified that his process had the same accuracy as fingerprint
identification, but the other state witness, Dr. Oscar Tosi, refused to
give a firm opinion before further study had been conducted. 9 The
testimony of two defense witnesses and the opinions expressed in
thirty-nine letters admitted as evidence indicated a lack of the general
scientific acceptance which the court required before it would take
judicial notice of the process. The court said:
The legal criterion of "general scientific acceptance as a
reliable means of ascertaining the truth" before judicial notice
can be taken of the technique or aid involved, permitting its
admissibility as evidence, accords with the standards set by
almost all of the courts in this country that have passed on the
issue, and most of them have. It is not for the law to
experiment but for science to do so... All scientific aids and
devices go through an experimental and testing stage, and
during these stages there may be considerable scientific
controversy. During this period of controversy over the
technique and aid involved, the danger is that a trial actually
may result in the trial of the technique rather than the trial of
the issues involved in the case, if some less exacting rule is
substituted for the time-honored rule of general scientific
acceptance, realizing that there may, even after general
acceptance, always be some lesser degree of doubt which time
may or may not clarify. United States v. Wright ... is an
example. 4 0
While Cary was like King and the Wright dissent in requiring general
scientific acceptance, it differed from those cases in apparently making
judicial notice of the process a prerequisite to admissibility.

B. LATER CASES
Kersta's work was subjected to much criticism4"

and Kersta had

39. Tosi's study had not yet been conducted. See Tosi, supra note 2.
40. State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 332, 239, A.2d 680, 684 (1968).
41. LADEFOGED, supra note 32, at 142:

We believe that Kersta has hoodwinked the press, the public, the law, and perhaps himself into believing his claims about "voiceprint" identification. He does
this mainly by misleadingly reporting the results of a largely irrelevant experiment, and by making dogmatic assertions which he cannot substantiate. There is
grave danger in the continued cultivation of the "voiceprint" mystique-the complex of transcendental, semi-mystical beliefs surrounding, and tending to endue
with an esoteric and scientific truth value, the manipulation of snipped-up
spectrograms.
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43
4
admitted to one mistaken identification; 2 but a major study
completed after the Wright, King, and Cary cases concluded that it had
"confirmed the figures reported by Kersta in 1962." 4 4 The scientist in
charge of this study, Dr. Tosi, testified for the state in the case of State
ex rel. Thimble v. Hedman4 ' and United States v. Raymond. 4 6
The Trimble case was an appeal from an order discharging a writ of
habeas corpus. The court held that an identification based on
spectrogram examination is admissible in a hearing to determine
jusification for the issuance of an arrest and search warrant but
emphasized that it was admissible only for the purpose of corroborating
an aural identification. 4 '
Dr. Tosi testified that as a result of his comparison of more than
34,000 spectrograms over a period of about four years, 4 8 he was now
of the opinion that the method was extremely reliable. 4 ' The defense
witness, Dr. Peter Ladefoged, s ° said that he agreed with Tosi's results
and that the scientific community accepted them with limitations, but
the process was still too uncertain to be accepted by the courts. He

42.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

48.
49.

50.

See Bolt, supra note 14; Stevens, supra note 32; Young and Campbell, Effects of Context on Talker Identification, 42 J. ACOUST. Soc. AMER. 1250 (1967).
"A company that specializes in identifying people by their voiceprints now says that its
original identification of a high-ranking police official demoted during a corruption
investigation was wrong." N.Y. Times, March 27, 1971, at 57, col. 2.
Tosi, supra note 2.
Id. at 2041.
State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972).
State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 458, 192 N.W.2d 432, 441 (1971). The
court added as dictum:
While we deal here with the sufficiency of proof to establish probable cause for
the issuance of an arrest warrant, we are convinced that in the trial of the case
spectrograms ought to be admissible for the purpose of corroborating voice identification by aural means if a sufficient foundation is laid to satisfy the trial judge
that the expert whose opinion is sought is qualified to assist the factfinder in
coming to the right conclusion. The qualification of an expert is normally left to
the discretion of the trial judge and we think that ought to be the rule here as well
as in other fields of scientific study.
See Tosi, supra note 2.
State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 453-54, 192 N.W.2d 432, 438-39 (1971):
Q. Dr. Tosi, could you express an opinion as to the reliability of voiceprint examination by the Kersta voiceprint method by a trained examiner, who is given all
of the time that he needs to make an examination, who listens to the spoken
material as well as analyzes the voiceprint, who is allowed to grade and produce
an opinion as to the reliability of what he is saying, who is given adequate and
sufficient training in the manufacture of voiceprints and reading of voiceprints, who has a high degree of job responsibility and experience? Could you
express an opinion as to the degree of reliability of such an examiner's opinion?
A. Well, yes, certainly. Providing that all these conditions that you have expressed, especially that the examiner is responsible and he is allowed to say,
"Well, I don't know, I cannot produce in this case an identification," and only
in those cases in which he is absolutely sure of his statement, I think that
then the method is very highly extremely reliable.
See LADEFOGED, supra note 32.
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agreed, however, that its use in conjunction with aural identification
would make the latter more reliable. Dr. Ladefoged contended that
Tosi's study had not used female voices, which were more difficult to
compare but Tosi maintained that he could identify female voices as
well as male voices. ' The court's rationale was similar to that in the
Wright case:
It is common knowledge that the opinion of an expert on an
identification subject is seldom so infallible that others in his
field do not disagree with him. But disagreement alone does not
make the opinion inadmissible. Where experts disagree, it is for
the factfinder... to determine which is more credible... In the
field of medicine, it is not unusual to have doctors disagree as to
the cause or effect of an illness or accident.' 2
The Raymond court held that spectrogram identification was
admissible ". . .on the basis of the extensive Tosi study, his testimony
in open court, and the opinions expressed by other experts. . ."' ' The
court explained that Tosi's study had remedied the two major defects
in Kersta's study5" and that Tosi's approximate false identification rate
of six percent would be further reduced by certain practices not
employed by Tosi including the use of experienced examiners aided by
recordings of the voices compared. The court also noted a substantial
change in the scientific community's attitude toward the process, citing
as an example Dr. Ladefoged, who had testified against admissibility in
Trimble but who favored it in the case at bar. Ladefoged testified that
the scientific community's views were substantially the same as those
he had expressed in a letter admitted into evidence. The letter stated
51. State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 456, 192 N.W.2d 432, 440 (1971). Appellant Trimble was a woman. Tosi's Michigan study had compared only male voices
and he had recommended that it be "complimented by the testing of female voices.
See Tosi, supra note 2, at 2041.
52. State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 241 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
53. 337 F. Supp. at 643.
First, Kersta was criticized for using a heterogeneous sampling of unknown
54.
voices, i.e., the spectrograms used represented speakers with different accents,
of different ages and backgrounds, and that this fact made it easier to differentiate between speakers. Tosi, on the other hand, used a homogeneous sampling
of 250 students at Michigan State University, each of whom was carefully
screened by Tosi's associates from a group of over 25,000 students. Thus, the
250 selected each spoke what is referred to as non-accented, or General-American
English, had no noticable speech defects, were all male, undergraduate students,
and ranged in age from 19 to 34. The second major criticism of the Kersta experiment was that it was conducted using only closed testing groups, i.e., that the
spectrogram of the unknown voice was always included in the group of known
voices being used. Thus, in the Kersta test, all the examiner had to do was find
the sample in the known group of spectrograms that most closely matched the
spectrogram of the unknown voice in order to make an "identification". Dr. Tosi,
mindful of this defect, set up both open and closed experiments, i.e., in the open
tests, the examiners were told that the spectrogram of the unknown voice may or
may not be among the spectrograms of the known speakers.
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that "in the past year various events have made me cautiously reconsider
the possibility" of the use of spectrograms in legal proceedings; and
later, "If I were asked to testify on the validity of the system, I would
have to emphasize that we do not at the moment know the probable
error rate. But I would accept a minimum of six percent as a rough
estimate of the possibility of making a misidentification. . ."" Thus,
when the court said that the basis for its decision included the opinions
expressed by other experts, it was not adopting the general scientific
acceptance test of admissibility, for, as Ladefoged's testimony and
letter indicated, the scientific community had not yet become
convinced of the value of the process as a forensic tool.

CONCLUSION
The courts in these cases have chosen with variations between two
tests as a basis for their decisions on the admissibility of the process of
voice identification based on spectrographic analysis: (1) general
scientific acceptance and (2) judicial determination of accuracy and
reliability.5 6 Court adoption of the "general scientific acceptance" test
is mandated by reasons which evolve primarily from the necessity of
attaining some probative value in voice identifications based on this
process.' s Courts are not qualified to make the scientific judgments
which they must make if they are to employ the' "accuracy and
reliability" test. Judicial determinations of the process' accuracy and
reliability are based on the results of scientific studies and necessarily
include judgments as to whether the studies relied upon have utilized
scientifically valid methods. Judgments must be made regarding the
validity of the variables tested, the number and selection of subjects,
the training of examiners, the design and experimental procedures and
the interpretation of results ;S8 these judgments are more properly
made by the scientific community than by the courts. Although the
courts are required to determine when the process has in fact achieved
general scientific acceptance when using that test, it is more logical that
they undertake this task for it involves legal rather than scientific
judgment.
Although the process validity can be attacked through cross-examination and contradictory testimony if admitted under the accuracy
55. Record Exhibit C, United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972).
56. Other scientific processes have been judged by these same tests. See Boyce, Judicial
Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REV. 313 (1964).
Some jurisdictions have mandated the admissibility of the results of certain scientific
processes by statute. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 91 (1971).
57. But see Kamine, The Voiceprint Technique: Its Structure and Reliability, 6 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 213 (1969); See also Cedarbaums,

Voiceprint Identification: A Scien-

tific and Legal Dilemma, 5 CRIM. LAW BULL. 323 (1969).
58. See Tosi, supra note 2.
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and reliability test, an even greater anomaly results because
then the problem of making scientific judgments confronts the
members of the jury who are even less equipped to deal with it than are
the courts. Some jury members will disregard esoteric scientific
testimony altogether," 9 while others relying on misleading terms such
60
as "voiceprint" will give it more weight than it logically deserves.
Even under the general scientific acceptance test, the jury will be
confronted with contradictory scientific testimony, but only on the
point of disagreement as to whether or not spectrographic analysis has
the general acceptance of the scientific community. However, if the
courts cbuple the general scientific acceptance test with the requirethis problem will be
ment of judicial notice of the process, 6
minimized, for the majority of jurisdictions prohibit contradiction of
an item that has been judicially noted. 6 2 Since Dr. Tosi completed his
Michigan study the process of voice identification based on spectrographic analysis has been viewed more favorably by certain scientists
but the courts should defer
who had formerly opposed it,6
recognition of this process until it has received the acceptance of the
general scientific community.
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59. Following the Arthur Bremer trial, the jury foreman said of the psychiatrists who had
testified for both prosecution and defense, "They used so many big words... They
couldn't agree. They were so evasive. You had to use horse sense." N.Y. Times, Aug. 5,
1972, at 40, col. 3.
60. "We doubt that the reliability of voice identification can ever match that of fingerprint identification." Bolt, supra note 14, at 600. "Differences between them seem to
exceed similarities." Bolt, supra note 14, at 599.
61. See State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 280 (1968).
62. Nicketta v. National Tea Co., 338 Il. App. 159, 87 N.E.2d 30 (1949); Proposed Rules
of Evidence for the U.S. District Courts and Magistrates 201(g) and accompanying
note.
63. See note 56 supra.

